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CRIMINAL COURTS AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE*
Hon. Stephen A. Schiller and Peter M. Manikas**
The judicial system in Cook County has been shaken by the indictment,

prosecution, and conviction of judges, lawyers, law enforcement officers,
and court personnel in connection with Operation Greylord., The Greylord
investigation revealed not only criminal misconduct but also widespread
irregularities in the court system. Some judges commonly conducted ex parte
communications, 2 manipulated the assignment of cases,3 and repeatedly ig4
nored or routinely violated several other rules.
Attempts have been made to remedy the most blatant abuses disclosed in

the Greylord trials,' yet a gap remains between the court's formal rules and
actual legal practice. This Article explores the meaning of this lacuna between
formal rules and the practice of law in the criminal courts. We suggest that
the courts' formal rules and informal customs be reconciled so that the
reality in a criminal courtroom reflects the theoretical underpinnings of our
system of justice. Our recommendations also call for greater involvement by
professional organizations and all segments of the bar in ensuring compliance
with the court's written rules.
I. BACKGROUND
An observer who visits an urban criminal courtroom expecting to find a
textbook application of the "rule of law" might well be disappointed. The
* This Article arose from the work of the Felony Courts Task Force of the Special
Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County. The authors wish to especially
acknowledge the helpful advice and criticisms of Jerold S. Solovy, the Commission's chairman
and Lawrence X. Pusateri, chairman of the Felony Court's Task Force. Nancy M. Zaczek, a
staff attorney for the Commission, also provided valuable research in the preparation of this
Article. The views and conclusions expressed here, however, are the authors' and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Commission or Task Force members.
** Honorable Stephen A. Schiller is a judge serving in the Cook County Court's Criminal
Division and formerly served as Executive Director for the Chicago Crime Commmission. B.S.,
Roosevelt University; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. Peter M. Manikas is the
Executive Director of the Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County.
B.A., Roosevelt University; M.A., George Washington University; J.D., DePaul University
College of Law.
1. Operation Greylord is an undercover investigation of the corruption in Cook County's
court system conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Atorney's
Office for the Northern District of Illinois. As of June 1, 1987, the investigation had led to
the conviction over fifty persons, including nine judges.
2. See infra note 49.
3. See Kent, Perspectives on a Judiciary Gone Wrong, Chicago Lawyer, July 1986, at 14,
col. 3-4.
4. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
5. In January 1985, the Circuit Court of Cook County enacted a new rule strengthening
the prohibition on ex parte communications. See Cm. CT. CooK Co. R. 17.
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formal rules that govern courtroom decorum, require the speedy disposition
of criminal cases, and provide the right to a jury trial are central to our
conception of justice. Yet the events that actually occur in a criminal
courtroom bear little resemblance to classical textbook adversary proceedings.
The proceedings in criminal branch courts, where misdemeanor cases and
felony preliminary hearings are heard, appear chaotic to most visitors.
Dozens of cases are processed in rapid succession and nothing resembling a
trial occurs. Most cases are disposed of in a few minutes. The defendant,
lawyers, and witnesses stand clustered before the judge where their voices
are inaudible to others in the courtroom. Defendants who have been arrested
the previous night are escorted to the bench where they meet the public
defender, their lawyer, for the first time. The public defender has only a
few seconds to glance at the police report and determine what amount of
bail should be requested or by what amount the prosecutor's request can be
reduced. Bonds are set, continuances are granted, and guilty pleas are
accepted swiftly. Few, if any, complex legal or factual issues are raised or
heard.
Between cases, lawyers, clerks, and bailiffs engage in friendly conversations
as they wander in and out of the courtroom. Often the judge also engages
in this friendly banter. The day ends early, despite a heavy backlog of cases
6
and by mid-afternoon many courtrooms are empty.
Greater decorum prevails in felony courtrooms, where more serious cases
are heard. A visitor is far more likely to view a jury trial taking place. Inside
the courtroom, the congested, frenetic atmosphere of the lower courts is
replaced by a hushed formality appropriate for consideration of serious
matters.7

Yet what occurs in felony courtrooms is still far from what might be
expected. When the courts are not in session, defense attorneys and prosecutors may be relaxing amicably in the judge's chambers, joined by other
courtroom personnel. In the morning, when motions are heard, the speedy
trial requirement inexplicably gives way to seemingly endless continuances.
While jury trials are not uncommon, only a small portion of the thousands
of felony cases that enter the court system each year are disposed of by a
trial.' Most are settled by plea bargaining, which might take place in the
prosecutor's office, the courthouse hallways, or the judge's chambers. 9

6. For a description of criminal branch courts, see J.

& H. JACOB, FELONY
19-20 (1977) [hereinafter EISENSTEIN & JACOB]. See also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
7. See H. JACOB, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 183-87 (1986) (describes felony
criminal proceedings).
8. In 1984, 20,001 felony cases were disposed in the Criminal Division of the Circuit
Court of Cook County resulting in 4,756 trials. Of these, 4,268 were bench trials and 488 were
jury trials. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, REPORT To THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS 217 (1984).
9. EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 6, at 183.
EISENSTEIN
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The proceedings in criminal courtrooms do not result from formal, externally imposed rules alone. There also are informal procedures and unspoken
rules and customs which shape courtroom behavior. The gap between the
formal and informal rules-what the public expects and what actually
occurs in practice-is largely the product of the "local legal culture. ' "'
The local legal culture is the product of accommodations reached within
the "courthouse workgroup,." which consists of judges, policemen, bailiffs,
clerks, public defenders, prosecutors, and private defense attorneys who
work together on a daily basis. The workgroup members come from different
sponsoring organizations: the State's Attorney's Office provides prosecutors,
the Public Defender's Office sends defense lawyers, and the Clerk of the
Circuit Court supplies the clerks." Yet despite their disparate origins and
the different objectives of their sponsoring organizations, the workgroup
members arrive at shared values and goals. These shared values sometimes
undermine stated objectives. For example, a recent report of the Cook
County Court Watching Project found, "The expectations of the whole
system appear to be low productivity and low efficiency, with the pace of
justice geared to the wishes of the judges, prosecutors and private defense
counsel and other court personnel-not the consumers of the system-the
citizens who must appear in court."' 2
The workgroup is affected by other governmental agencies, reviewing
courts, and political organizations as well as by broader social and economic
forces. Nevertheless, as several Operation Greylord cases demonstrate, the
workgroup in the criminal branch courts can become highly deviant. This
can and does lead to widespread violations of formal rules and professional
norms. It also has led to violations of the criminal law and more generally
held conceptions of morality.' 3
The existence of a local legal culture does not set the court system apart
from other large organizations. Many institutions adjust their practices to
suit the needs and interests of their members. 14 Unlike other organizations,
however, courts rely in large measure on conformity with formal rules of

10. Local legal culture has been defined as "the practitioner norms governing case handling

and participant behavior in a criminal court." Church, Examining Local Legal Culture, 1985
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 449, 451 (emphasis in original).
11. EISEN SEIN & JACOB, supra note 6, at 20-21, 24-28. See Blumberg, The Practiceof Law
as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, in CRIME AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 233 (W. Chamblis ed. 1969).
12. Testimony of Suzanne E. Jones, President of the Cook County Court Watching Project,
before the Finance Committee of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, Jan. 29, 1985.
13. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Murphy,
768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986).
14. In the view of one attorney, "[Jiudicial practice ... reflects an accommodation of the
interests of the participants. In the abstract this accommodation may not be ideal but in context
it is at least acceptable." M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRAL 191 (1983) (quoting Raymond
T. Nimmer).
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law to maintain their legitimacy. When actual practices significantly depart
from the formal rules and the public's expectations, those practices appear
improper. The legitimacy of our system of justice is then called into question.' 5
In felony courtrooms, formal rules are disregarded for several reasons and
in different ways. Some of the court's rules are no longer relevant due to
changed circumstances, 16 while other rules are simply unenforced. 17 Rules,
such as the prohibition of ex parte communications, are observed unevenly.
They are sometimes breached by the prosecutor, sometimes by defense
counsel, and occasionally by the judge or outside persons interested in the
dispute."8 The statute that requires motions for continuances to be supported
by reasons is rarely enforced. 9 In the branch courts, even criminal statutes
such as those prohibiting bribes to court clerks and other court personnel
have been widely ignored for decades.20
The repeated failure to observe formal rules, even when done innocently,
creates an appearance of impropriety. Moreover, when practices vary substantially from courtroom to courtroom, it may appear as if cases are being
manipulated to affect their outcome. Public confidence in the integrity of
the court system is not likely to be enhanced by highly idiosyncratic court
practices.
II.

A.

SHAPING THE COURT ENVIRONMENT

Fragmentation of the Criminal Justice System

The local legal culture is shaped by the fragmented nature of the criminal
justice system. 2' The personnel assigned to a courtroom report to different

15. As Alexander Hamilton noted, the judiciary lacks the powers of both the purse and
the sword. Thus, it must rely in large measure on voluntary compliance with its internal rules
and regulations as well as with judicial decisions. See 78 FEDERA.IST, THE JUDGES AS GUARDIANS
OF THE CONSTITUTION, quoted in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH vix (1962). If
voluntary compliance could not be expected, a virtual army would be required to monitor the
lawyers, litigants and their family members, witnesses, and court personnel who come to court
each day.
16. See CIR. CT. COOK Co. R. 15.6(d) (discusses Witness Central, an agency that was
discontinued due to the cutoff of federal funds).
17. See CIR. CT. CooK Co. R. 15.1(h), 15.1(i). These rules, providing for notification to
the presiding judge concerning "ready" and "priority" cases, are frequently ignored.
18. See infra notes 25 & 49.
19. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-4 (1985). For observations regarding the court's
policies toward granting continuances, see REPORT OF COOK COUNTY COURT WATCHING PROJECT,
at 175-76 (1984).
20. See J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 155-64 [hereinafter CARLIN].
21. M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL (1983). Of the criminal justice process, Feeley
states, "Perhaps its most visible quality is fragmentation: it is fragmented in its organization,
its operations and its goals." Id. at 9.
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governmental units and are paid from different sources. The bailiffs who
guard prisoners and maintain order are assigned to the courtroom by the
County Sheriff; the clerks report to the Clerk of the County Court; and the
Assistant State's Attorneys are supervised by the State's Attorney of Cook
County, an elected public official. The Assistant Public Defenders, probation
officers, and secretaries are court employees. Judges are supervised by the
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, but receive their salaries largely out of
22
state funds.
As a result of this fragmentation, the judges have limited authority over
the courtroom workgroups. Judges neither hire nor fire personnel, they
cannot promote good performance by offering salary increases, nor can they
demote or impede the advancement of those who perform poorly. Judges
also do not control the budget of their courtroom; their power to meet
courtroom needs by ordering a new public address system or repairing an
air conditioner is limited. Their influence over the other workgroup participants resides largely with their formal legal authority, such as their contempt
23
powers, and their informal powers of persuasion.
B.

Insulation from the Public and Legal Profession

The felony court workgroups are also insulated from the public and a
large portion of the legal profession. In Cook County, the felony courts are
geographically isolated, often located miles away from the civil courts. The
main location at 2600 South California Avenue in Chicago is not easily
accessible from downtown where many private law offices are located. As
a result, for most of the public, the felony courts are alien territory.
The routine activities of the felony courts are largely shielded from public
scrutiny.2 4 While there is a press room in the felony court building, the news
media generally focuses its attention on particularly violent crimes, partisan
courtroom politics, and judicial misconduct. Journalists who cover the criminal courts are often reporters regularly assigned to that beat who sometimes
become peripheral members of the courthouse workgroups. Reporters may
develop a dependency on judges, prosecutors, other government officials,

22. In Cook County, a small proportion of judicial salaries is paid out of the County's
budget. The 1986 budget, for example, provided $500 for each circuit court and associate
judge's salary, amounting to $172,000. COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, THE ANNUAL ApPROPRJATIONS BILL (approved and adopted Feb. 1986).

23. The quality of a judge's work will suffer, for example, if the clerk's records do not
accurately reflect the status of a case and the orders that previously have been entered. Nor
can the court's work go forward if there are inadequate security personnel to maintain order
in the courtroom or control prisoners.
24. The public's lack of knowledge and misperceptions about the criminal justice system
have been noted by several observers. Herb Jacob, for example, wrote, "[T]here is more
misunderstanding about the actual processes used by the courts in criminal prosecutions than
in most areas of the governmental process." H.
AMERICAN CITES 96 (1973).

JACOB,
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and private lawyers for their stories." As a result, the decision to cover some
events and not others sometimes is not made on the basis of the story's
"newsworthiness" alone.
The felony courts are isolated professionally as well as geographically from
a large segment of the legal community. Judges assigned to felony courtrooms
have little professional exposure to lawyers who practice in other fields.
Lawyers who accept criminal cases tend to handle relatively few cases or
specialize in this field of practice. 26 In the branch courts, a large portion of
cases are handled by "regulars" who appear frequently in the same courtroom. These lawyers develop on-going relationships with judges, bailiffs,
probation officers, and other courtroom personnel.2 7 These courthouse regulars have few collegial ties to lawyers in other fields of practice. Lawyers
who specialize in criminal law appear to be socially and professionally distant
2
from those in other fields of law. 1
C. Political Environment
To some extent, the local legal culture is shaped by the larger political
system. Judges are elected public officials who seek slating by a political
party to run for office and raise campaign funds for both primary and
general elections. Judges must seek retention every six years. They incur
"political debts" in obtaining office and raising funds which erodes the
image of an independent judiciary and may create the appearance that a
29
judge's decision is motivated by political considerations.
The electoral process has recruited judicial candidates mainly from the
ranks of political figures.3 0 One recent study found that almost one-third of

25. One reporter who covered the Cook County criminal courts wrote:
Most disturbing to me was that certain pressroom reporters were in cahoots with
certain lawyers. These reporters were able to put their fact-finding facilities at the
service of their pals; they could ignore cases that merited coverage ... ; they could
rummage through the barrel of facts in a case and turn in something favorable to
the clients of a crony; or they could intercede (with a judge, prosecutor or witness),
which, to be blunt, means, more or less, "fix."
Block, Judges and the Press: The Power to Suppress, 16 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 445, 446 (1985).
26. A study of Chicago lawyers found that of those attorneys who devote at least five
percent of their practice to criminal cases, fifty-two percent devote between five percent and
twenty-five percent of their time in this field and thirty-six percent devote over half of their
time to criminal law practice. This bimodal pattern is not confined to the practice of criminal
law. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 47-48
(1982) [hereinafter HEINZ & LAUANN].
27. EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 6, at 117-21.
28. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 26, at 221 (figure 7.1) Heinz and Laumann note
that the Chicago bar is divided into distinct social circles. The criminal bar appears to be
further removed from the "center" of the profession than other practitioners. Id.
29. Party slatemaking sessions frequently elicit affirmations of party loyalty, only adding
to the appearance that judicial candidates will lack independence after reaching the bench. See,
e.g., Chi. Tribune, Nov. 11, 1985, § 2, at 2, col. 1.
30. See J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, R. SALES & S. SHANE-DuBow, AMERICAN TRIA JUDGES:
THEIR WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE 204-05 (1980).
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Chicago judges came directly from an elected or appointed public position)'
Furthermore, many judges have done less visible work for a political party
and are sponsored by political figures.3 2 The same recruitment pattern can
be found in the selection of associate judges, who are elected by the full
circuit court judges. In October 1986, for example, eight of the thirteen
associate judges elected were current or former lawyers for government
agencies."
Judicial independence is also affected by the judge's relationship with the
organized bar. Bar associations evaluate both full circuit court judges and
associate judges when they seek office. When circuit court judges stand for
retention every six years, a major factor is the review of a candidate's
performance by committees of bar groups. These performance evaluations
are made largely by lawyers who practice before the judge. Consequently,
these lawyers may be perceived by judges as having power over their retention, power that can be used as leverage by influential lawyers when they
appear before the judge.3 4 Bar associations also recognize judicial performance by granting judges awards and favorable publicity through their publications and public ceremonies. The effect of these activities is difficult to
measure, yet it seems reasonable to assume that many judges feel pressure,
however subtle, to provide favorable treatment to lawyers who are considered
to be influential within bar groups. Electoral pressure also can be exerted
on judges from any group interested in the outcome of a case or dissatisfied
with a judge's performance. Judges who have made decisions in controversial
cases affecting competing political forces have been targeted for defeat in
their campaigns to be retained on the bench. 35
D.

The Social Structure of the Metropolitan Bar

The metropolitan bar is highly stratified. 36 Lawyers in large firms have a
much different practice than do lawyers in small firms and solo practitioners.
The differences among lawyers, in fact, is so stark that it sometimes appears
that there are really several different legal professions. 37

31. Id. Additionally, an informal survey by the authors found that approximately half of
the judges in the Criminal Division of the Cook County Circuit Court previously served as
either prosecutors or public defenders. In Philadelphia, one judge in six formerly held a political
position. In Los Angeles, the ratio was one judge in twelve. Id. at 32.
32. Id. at 207.

33. Chi. Tribune, Oct. 13, 1984, § 2, at 4, col. 3-4.
34. Judge Marvin Aspen, a Federal District Court judge who at one time sat in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, noted that state court judges have difficulty making decisions that
might be viewed as unpopular by influential people. Neubauer, Snyder & Nolan, Judges Compare
Courts, THE J. OF THE SECTION ON LITIGATION, A.B.A. 10 (Spring 1985).

35. See, e.g., Chi. Sun-Times, Oct. 12, 1986, at 57, col. 5.
36. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 26.
37. A recent study of the Chicago bar described the profession's social structure this way:
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Most lawyers do not view criminal law as a prestigious area of practice."'
Within the legal profession, fields of practice in which lawyers represent
individuals rather than businesses or organizations generally rank lower in
prestige. 3 9 Criminal defense lawyers also tend to practice alone or in small
firms and have attended local, rather than national or regional law schools. 40
Within the bar itself, this area of practice is viewed as having a high incidence
of ethical misconduct. 41 Perhaps because of these characteristics, criminal
defense lawyers tend to be under-represented in the leadership positions of
professional organizations.42
Attorneys who practice criminal law also are more likely than lawyers in
other fields of practice to be exposed to particular types of unethical misconduct, such as the abuses arising in Operation Greylord. In the branch
courts, lawyers have openly solicited clients in the courtrooms or in the
court's hallways to obtain business. 43 It is difficult to imagine lawyers
practicing in the court's upper level civil division "renting courtrooms" or
routinely and openly making illegal payoffs to clerks to have their cases
called early." It is also in the criminal courts that lawyers are most exposed
to court personnel and others, including their clients, who are most likely

In large cities like Chicago ... the differences among the several sorts of lawyers
are dramatic. The lawyer who commutes to Brussels and Tokyo and who spends
his time negotiating the rights to distribute Colonel Sanders throughout the world
will have little in common with the lawyer who haunts the corridors of the criminal
courts hoping that a bailiff will, in return for a consideration, commend his services
to some poor wretch charged with a barroom assault. Both of those private
practitioners will differ from the government-employed lawyers who prosecute
criminal cases or who practice public international law in the employ of the State
Department.
Id. at 3-5.

38. Id. at 91. Chicago lawyers ranked criminal prosecution twenty-first and criminal defense
twenty-third among thirty fields of law. Id. (table 4.1).
39. Id. at 127. Heinz and Laumann noted that "the side that represents the more 'establishment' client is consistently rated higher in prestige. That is, those who defend criminals are
given less prestige than those who prosecute." Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 133-34, 442-43 (table B.3, app. B). See F. ZaMAs & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAINO
A PUBLIC PROFESSION 99 (1981) [hereinafter ZEMANs & ROSENBLUM] (there is a statistically
significant linear trend for private practitioners from national law schools to work in larger
organizational settings).
41. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 26, at 103, 124. The authors note that "certain
types of cases-for example, personal injury, criminal defense and divorce-are perceived
as more likely to be handled by lawyers who employ 'sharp practices' that are contrary to the
prevailing ethical norms of the profession." Id. at 124.
42. Id. at 133 (five percent or fewer of the criminal defense and personal injury lawyers
in the sample had been Chicago Bar Association leaders).
43. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986). See also CAaLIN, supra
note 20.
44. Lawyers who practice in other divisions encounter additional forms of ethical misconduct. For a discription of such problems in the Chancery Division, see United States v. Holzer,
Indictment of the Special October 1983 Grand Jury, (N.D. Ill.) (May 1, 1985).
OF
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to engage in unethical or illegal conduct. The criminal defense bar, at least
in the criminal branch courts, competes for clients in situations unlike lawyers
in other areas of practice. In the criminal courts, opportunities and incentives
to become involved in unethical or corrupt practices are often far greater.
There are many individual exceptions to these generalizations. Some criminal defense lawyers have achieved a national reputation for their highly
developed legal skills. Moreover, the vast majority of the criminal defense4
bar is probably at least as ethical as those in other fields of practice.
However, the general point is clear. Criminal defense lawyers (as well as
other lawyers who handle "personal plight" cases) are not held in high
esteem by their professional colleagues. 46 They represent low-status and lowincome clients, tend to earn less income, do not command the resources
or within
available to large firm lawyers, and have little contact socially 47
professional organizations with higher status members of the bar.
III.

FoRMAL AND INoRmAL RULES

The local legal culture is shaped by the characteristics of the criminal
justice system as well as by relationships with the larger political and professional community. The proceedings in a felony courtroom are often the
result of accommodating these various interests rather than conforming to
formal rules. For example, ex parte communications have been common
despite a ban on these conversations. 48 To efficiently arrange the judge's
court call, prosecutors often meet with judges prior to the court's opening
session to review cases and discuss how they might most readily be disposed.

45. Carlin stated that "the purity of those at the top may be purchased by the morally
questionable practice of personally assigning contaminating tasks to those in subordinate
positions." He quotes one lawyer as saying, "I've been shocked by members of large firms
who bring clients here and suggest I should fix this thing-talk to cops or the judge. It's
these 'respectables' who suggest we go in and try to put in the fix." J. CARLIN, LAWYER
Ermcs: A SURVEY OF THE NEw YORK CITY BAR 173 (1966) [hereinafter LAWYER ETMcs].
46. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 26, at 452 (table B.6). The "personal plight" area
includes fields such as civil rights, criminal defense, divorce, family, and personal injury law
(plaintiff).
47. Id. at 440 (table B.2) (discussion of lawyer's incomes). With the exception of lawyers
working for the government, those in the "personal plight" area appear to have lower incomes,
as a group, than in any other field of legal practice. The role of criminal defense lawyers in
the organized bar is discussed id. at 133. See also ZEmAts & ROSENBLUM supra note 40, at 76
(discussion of lawyer specialization).
The income of criminal defense lawyers is somewhat lower because many who practice
criminal law are employed to do so full-time by the government. However, it is also true that
attorneys in another line of practice rarely devote a significant portion of their time to criminal
defense work.
48. In January 1985, the Circuit Court of Cook County enacted a new local rule strengthening the prohibition of ex parte communications. See CIR. CT. COOK Co. R. 17. The rule
was passed in response to a recommendation made by the Felony Courts Task Force of the
Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County.
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Defense attorneys also might discuss, ex parte, cases with a judge either to
49
clarify a procedural matter or the merits of a pending case.
Formal rules also give way to the need for efficiency or other accommodations for courtroom participants. The protocol for advancing cases and
treating the most serious cases first might be ignored. Despite a strict written
policy toward granting continuances, they may be allowed routinely, permitting cases to drag on for years.10 Attorneys appear for trial unprepared
to try a case, yet go unsanctioned by the court. Sometimes, attorneys do
not show up at all. A recent report by the Cook County Court Watching
Project, for example, found that "[s]ome attorneys regularly delayed the
court by arriving late to represent their clients ....
Nearly 400 attorneys
were named by court watchers as 'no shows' with thirty-seven of them repeat
offenders in this category."'"
Accommodating the interests of courtroom participants also is illustrated
by the work habits prevailing in some Criminal Division courtrooms. Again,
the court watchers have found, "Most of these courts started late and
adjourned early, after only a few hours' work. On 86 percent of the days,
they began after 10 a.m. despite the stated opening hour of 9:30 a.m.; 55
5' 2
percent of the time, court was over for the day at or before 1 p.m.
Although there are clear rules to the contrary, workdays are short because
that is what the courtroom participants want and it is a situation which the
local legal culture sustains.
The formal rules, then, often are not enforced because to require strict
adherence would contravene the values and expectations of the local legal
culture. A judge or lawyer who violates the courtroom's prevailing norms
may be ostracized by other workgroup participants and would likely receive
little support from the professional community.53

49. For a graphic illustration of ex parte communications, see In re Laurie, No. 84 St. of
Ill. Cts. Comm'n, Stipulation of Facts 5 (1985). Judge Laurie was the first judge to be disciplined
for engaging in ex parte communications.
At Judge Laurie's earlier trial on federal criminal charges, which resulted in his acquittal, a
public defender gave the following account of ex parte contacts:
A. I would try to beat the prosecutor there [the judge's chambers] to better my
position. I wanted to give him my flavor of the facts rather than have him hear
the State's flavor first.
Q. And did you understand the State would try to do that as well?
A. Sure, it was a race on the case.
United States v. Laurie, No. 84 St. of Ill. Cts. Comm'n 2421, (N.D. II. 1984) (testimony of
George Grzcae, at 857).
50. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-4 (1985) (lists the grounds for which a continuance may
be granted in a criminal case).
51.

COOK COUNTY COURT WATCHERS,

INC., CITIZENS LOOK AT THEIR COURTS:

1984-1985,

29-30 (1986).
52. Id. at 13.

53. It might even be argued that given the sustained period over which an "alternative"
(though unstated) set of rules has been in effect, the official court rules have been nullified by
the doctrine of desuetude. It might be considered unfair or improper to suddenly enforce
formally adopted but long ignored rules without reenacting them.
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DEVIANT LEGAL SUBCULTURES: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

As the Greylord trials demonstrate, courthouse workgroups sometimes not
only reach agreements to adopt informal procedures leading to casual breaches
of the court's rules, they also sometimes consent to serious ethical misconduct
and even to violations of the criminal law. Whether this reflects a rejection
of the profession's and the public's dominant norms and values has been
the subject of much scholarly debate. 14
While the evidence is ambiguous, it seems just as likely that norms are
"neutralized" or "nullified" rather than expressly repudiated. Attorneys and
court personnel may believe that certain rules are appropriate, but only in
an "ideal situation." They may believe that it is simply impractical to
slavishly adhere to formal rules under existing conditions. The current rules
are neglected, but there is no effort to change them or defend the informal
or deviant procedures that operate in their place."
The techniques used for neutralizing normative behavior were noted by
sociologists Gresham Sykes and David Matza in their study of juvenile
delinquency.56 In substance, this framework involves the actor's denying
responsibility, denying the existence of an injury to a victim, condemning
the accusers, and appealing to higher loyalties.57
These techniques operate as follows:
1. Denying Responsibility: This technique might be reflected by the expression, "In order to get along, you have to go along." Judges and lawyers
come into a legal system which is not of their own making; they are not
responsible for a system in which court clerks receive tips and ex parte
communications are common. Yet they have to participate in at least minor
forms of misconduct in order to compete or to "fit in." '
2. Denying Injury: By helping certain litigants or influential lawyers, we
are benefiting someone and injuring no one. With the strong heritage of
political experience in the "political plight" area of law, we are likely to

54. For a general review of this debate, see LAWYER ETHICS, supra note 45, at 4-8, 17076. One author's theory of "differential association," which hypothesizes that "criminal
behaviour is learned in association with those who define such criminal behaviour favorably
and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably." E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRME
240 (1983). See also Westley, Secrecy and the Police, Soc. FORCES 254 (1956); Westley, Violence
and the Police, 59 AM. J. OF Soc. 34 (1953).
55. Thurman Arnold has attempted to explain the phenomenon of a community routinely
neglecting a law while at the same time avoiding initiatives to repeal or change it. He states:
"The laws are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because
we want to preserve our morals." T. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935).
56. Sykes & Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 Am. Soc.
REV. 664 (1957).
57. Id. at 667-69.
58. Id. at 667.
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have judges, lawyers, and clerks who are service oriented, especially toward
their own "constituencies. "5 9
Beyond the denial of an injury, the existence of a victim may also be
denied. A defendant who demands a costly jury trial deserves a more severe
sentence. Assistant Public Defenders have an interest in expeditiously processing their case load, judges have the burden of overloaded calendars of
pending cases, and private lawyers may also want to dispose of cases by a
less costly means than a jury trial. Consequently, the defendant who demands
the jury trial may be viewed as a "troublemaker" deserving additional
punishment, rather than the victim of an unfair sentence imposed as the
cost of exercising a constitutional right.
3. Condemning the Accuser: There may be a feeling among some lawyers
that the "downtown lawyers," court watchers, and other "do gooders" are
hypocritical. These critics have their own forms of corrupting rules and
compromising formal structures within their own areas of specialization.
4. Appealing to Higher Loyalties or Duties: There may be a feeling among
workgroup members that they are all working together. Those within the
workgroup have the same goal of providing legal services under difficult
conditions. To report a violation of a formal rule by a colleague would be
reprehensible, for it would undermine the stability of the workgroup. Unlike
the segment of the bar that represents more affluent clients, the workgroup
members deal with the problems of the poor. There are insufficient dollars
for them, from either clients or taxes, to support rigid compliance with the
courts' formal rules.
The issue concerning the role of norms in determining deviant subgroup
behaviour cannot readily be resolved. As others have observed, "No one
can doubt that norms exercise some influence on behaviour, but the question
of how much influence they exercise is highly debatable."' 6 In any case, the
widespread deviance from expressed professional norms and formal court
rules persists, at least in part, because of "an operational code" which treats
various forms of misconduct as acceptable. 6 While the precise nature of this
operational code is uncertain, its existence seems apparent.

59. In a comparative study of two criminal court systems the prior political experience of
Pittsburgh judges was described in terms that would apply to many in public office in Cook
County. The study noted that judges who have been precinct workers often helped voters and
provided favors in a wide range of problem areas. When they became judges, it was difficult
for them to identify an ex parte communication as improper when a case involved the interests
of someone identifed as being within the judge's "community of interest." M. LEvIN, URBAN
POLITICS AND TIE CRIMINAL COURTS 136-56 (1977). In another context, the Tammany Hall

politician, George Washington Plunkett, referred to this as "honest graft," bringing profit to
the office holder, but no harm to the public. See W. RIORDAN, PLUNKETT OF TAMMANY HALL

(1963).
60. BLAKE & DAVIS, Norms, Values and Sanctions, in
461 (R. Faris ed. 1964).

61. See W.
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REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS

(1979).
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Judges must follow the rule of law, even when to do so means that they
will face the disapproval of friends and colleagues. For judges, as well as
lawyers and court personnel, the pressure to conform with a culture that
eschews formal rules is strong. But that pressure must be resisted. There are
no easy answers to this problem; there is no "quick fix." In the long run,
if the judicial system is to retain the respect of the public, it must either
bring its actions into conformity with or alter the existing rules.
One of the greatest impediments to enforcing professional norms in the
courtroom is the fragmented nature of the bar. Attorneys who represent
individuals in "personal plight" cases, including criminal cases, are largely
sole or small firm practitioners. Moreover, a criminal defense lawyer "deals
with clients who, typically, lack wealth, political power, prestige [and] rec,,62 These lawyers are largely isolated from the elite lawyers of
titude .
the profession who wvork in large firms, represent wealthy, politically powerful clients and command substantial resources which can be used in their
clients' causes. These lawyers, because of their resources and influence in
the larger society, could use their position to help improve the administration
63
of justice in the criminal courts. Unfortunately, this rarely occurs."
More can be done directly to enforce formal rules and we recommend
such enforcement. But much of the conduct or misconduct that occurs in
the courtroom is not easily controlled. Professional ethics "remains the
'domain of the unenforceable,' the sanctions for proper behavior being the
"..."65Consequently, all segdesire for professional prestige and esteem .

62. See HEINZ &

LAUMANN,

supra note 26, at 359-60.

63. At the very least, greater awareness throughout the bar as to what differing demands
might be in each discrete area of practice could produce rules and laws that would provide a
visible process for addressing pressing needs.
64. The bar associations and their leadership have not completely ignored criminal justice
problems. See, e.g., CHICAGO BA

JUSTICE IN COOK

COUNTY,

ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1975). Such efforts, however, tend to be

sporadic. There is little or no sustained involvement in the criminal justice system by the more
prestigious firms or bar leadership over an extended period of time. As Jerome Carlin has
stated:
Isolation of the elite from rank and file members of the bar and from lower
.reaches of the administration of justice partly accounts for the unwillingness of bar
leaders to accept responsibility for seeking reform. Elite lawyers . . . are cut off
from meaningful contact with lower status lawyers. They have little in common
with the rank and file in social background and professional training and the two
groups are largely segregated from each other in work, social activities, and participation in professional association . . . . The elite lawyer's isolation from the lower
levels of the administration of justice tends to weaken his concern for the problems
of these institutions ....
LAWYER ETHICS, supra note 45, at 181-82.
65. C. TAEUSCH, Professional Ethics, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 472-75
(1934), reprinted in G. HAZARD & D. ROHDE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION

85 (1985).
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ments of the bar should assume responsibility for improving the administration of justice in the criminal courts. Lawyers with the greatest amount of
power and prestige should not be allowed to delegate their moral and
professional obligations."
There are steps that can be taken now to begin a process involving the
full weight of the bar:
1. The Chief Judge should conduct a survey to identify court rules relating
to the criminal division which are widely ignored or no longer needed. If
the rules are determined to be desirable, they should be enforced; if not
desirable, they should be eliminated. If the current "informal rules" are
defensible, they should be adopted formally.
2. Judges should be given more control over the personnel which operate
within their courtroom. Clerks, and perhaps bailiffs, should become employees of the Illinois Supreme Court's Administrative Office, subject to a
uniform personnel code.67
3. Judges must also be insulated from the partisan political process and
politics of the organized bar. In the absence of a merit (or appointive) system
of judicial selection, new rules should be considered for financing judicial
election and retention campaigns.
4. Judges should be rotated regularly among divisions every three to five
years to prevent overspecialization and periodically to revitalize judicial
performance in the courts' various divisions.
5. The organized bar must itself take a more active role to ensure that its
members understand and adhere to the formal rules. They also should offer
support for judges who attempt strictly to enforce those rules.
6. The major bar associations periodically should review basic practice
areas where ethical problems seem to be most acute. Review teams, consisting
of practitioners in a variety of fields from both small and large firms, should
review legal practice in the criminal courts. If practitioners cannot defend
standard operating procedures to a group of reasonably intelligent profes6
sionals, the procedures are unlikely to be justifiable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations are not a panacea to the problems posed by the
local legal culture. However, they would begin the process of altering that

66. A federal judge who came from a teaching and large law firm background noted while
sentencing a Greylord defendant: "I practiced law in this jurisdiction for many years, and I
must say I saw some things at traffic court that caused me to open my eyes. Who knows?
Maybe I played a part when I didn't do anything." Judge Prentice Marshall, quoted in Chi.
Sun-Times, May 22, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
67. See A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMISSIONS, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL COURTS 61 (1976).

68. A similiar periodic review process could be used in other highly specialized, and
insulated, practice areas such as domestic relations and law enforcement.
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culture and ensure the courts' accountability to the broader legal community
and the public. Criminal courtroom proceedings are too important to defendants, the legal community and society to permit the existing legal culture to
prevail.

